T
he existence of an interconnection grid linking members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) offers countries in the region a unique economic and financial opportunity to trade electricity as part of a regional power market, and not just in the case of emergency power outages. Studies by the Gulf Cooperation Council Interconnection Authority (GCCIA) and others have found that trading power among the GCC countries could save the member states about $5 billion in electricity sector investments and $1.8 billion in fuel costs between 2014 and 2038. There is clearly a strong economic case in favor of creating a GCCwide power market, and yet there has been little, if any, progress beyond the execution of short-term bilateral power deals.
The KAPSARC Toolkit for Behavioral Analysis (KTAB) platform, a model of collective decisionmaking processes (CDMPs), is an excellent tool for trying to understand the impediments to increased trade and to assess the political will for the development of a regional power trading platform using the GCC grid. This study focuses on the political feasibility of the expanded use of the GCC Interconnection Grid, ranging from bilateral power contracts to the development of a fully functional regional power market for the GCC. This paper used KTAB to perform a systematic analysis of the expected support for, and reactions to, power trading over the GCC grid. It also explores why so little progress has been made to date. The feasibility of the expanded use of the GCC grid, using this methodological approach, is correlated to the anticipated reaction of constituents and interest groups that will benefit or be impacted by this increase in grid utilization. These constituents include governments, regulators, power companies and consumers.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the value proposition offered by the greater use of the GCC grid for each stakeholder group and their constituent actors, evaluate how they might interact based on their individual preferences regarding regional power trading in the GCC, and assess the potential for areas of agreement among decision-makers and their constituent supporters. The KTAB methodology allows the user to simulate interactions among decision-makers (such as bargaining or negotiations) regarding a modeled policy question or issue.
These interactions take into account an actor's exercised power (a factor of an actor's influence and the importance an actor places on the modeled issue). Actors react to other actors depending on their preferences or utility, as well as the perception of other actors' utilities regarding the modeled issue. Such a simulation facilitates the evaluation of the political feasibility of reaching a consensus, as well as the form of consensus that is possible. It also provides insights into the status quo. This paper simulated a CDMP around the willingness for trading electricity among the GCC countries. Based on data collected from semi-structured interviews with subject matter experts in all six countries, it found that there is no strong disagreement among GCC members to the development of a power pool in the GCC. Table 1 presents a high level summary of results. The "current political will" column describes the aggregate expert opinion regarding the views of all relevant stakeholders and influencers for each country. In each case, the assessed political will for trading electricity over the GCC grid is positive, but with various levels of domestic disagreement. The "expected political will" column summarizes how this is likely to change over time, based on the results of the KTAB model simulations. This paper finds that there is growing political will, in each country and in the region as a whole, for the broader utilization of the GCC grid, and potentially for electricity trading. 
Executive Summary
The results range from moderately to strongly positive, which suggests a strong positive trend in political will. Consequently, this paper finds that political feasibility for the expanded use of the GCC Interconnection Grid is growing, increasing the likelihood of a GCC-wide electricity market. However, the dispute between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain would need to be resolved before region-wide trading is possible. In the short term, one-off bilateral trading appears more politically practical.
Despite the encouraging evidence suggesting that there is political will for expanded use of the GCC grid, the KTAB simulation results (and the clear economic and financial benefits) are no guarantee it will actually happen. Even before the deteriorating diplomatic situation in the region, there was insufficient political momentum to move a GCC electricity market forward. In particular, the KTAB methodology measures the 'salience' of the issue for each stakeholder, i.e., the degree of importance or urgency with which the issue is perceived. Salience levels for most actors regarding the issue of increased intra-regional power trade are low, especially in those GCC member states with the most regional clout to push forward this expanded use of the GCC grid, namely Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar. GCC member states with less clout, such as Kuwait and Oman, place a higher priority on GCC power trading than their neighbors but are less strongly in favor of expanded utilization of the GCC grid.
Overall, no GCC state has any strong, motivated champions that could push forward the regulatory policy synchronization required to enable a GCC power market. In particular, reconciliation of domestic energy prices and reform of domestic electricity markets are two of the most important policy issues that each country must resolve before they can move forward with regional power trade. Despite the political feasibility for electricity trade over the GCC grid, without a strong domestic advocate that can reconcile domestic concerns and raise the priority of regional power trade, then little progress can be expected even with a politically feasible outcome.
Furthermore, the dispute between Qatar and other GCC countries dampens some of the positive momentum observed in the simulations. The experts consulted for this study generally argued that the economic benefit of a GCC grid can overcome diplomatic differences, especially in the long-term. Indeed, Qatar continues to use the Dolphin pipeline to transport natural gas to the UAE and remains a participating member of the GCCIA.
Introduction
T he reliability of energy services is paramount for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. Indeed, electric power is critical: temperatures in the region can soar to 50 degrees centigrade and most states are entirely dependent on water produced through desalination. Faced with growing populations, domestic energy policymakers have historically countered this risk by building in a high degree of surplus capacity in national power systems with generous spinning reserve margins.
By the 1980s, the GCC began considering interconnecting the grids of its member countries as an additional way to increase energy security. In 1990, a study commissioned by the GCC Secretariat recommended the interconnection of all six GCC states, noting that it was both technically and financially feasible. However, it was not until 2001 that GCC energy ministers agreed to the establishment of a jointly-owned entity known as the GCC Interconnection Authority (GCCIA) to implement a regional grid. Unusually, instead of linking each neighboring country's national grid through simple interconnectors, the GCC opted for a fully-owned grid with circuits running through each of the GCC states. The only circuit not owned and operated by the GCCIA links Oman through the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
The GCCIA completed the project in three phases. The first phase, the Northern System, completed in 2009, saw the interconnection of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Qatar. Working in tandem, but independently of the GCCIA, the UAE and Oman worked on the second phase of the project, known as the Southern System, to link their respective grids. Finally, in 2010 the Northern and Southern systems were linked with the completion of a Qatar-UAE circuit, and a second link was created between Oman and the UAE. Figure 1 shows the GCC-wide grid, with both the Northern and Southern systems.
By creating an independently-owned and operated power backbone linking Kuwait through to the UAE, the GCC achieved tangible success in regional cooperation. The regional interconnection system includes not only a 400 kilovolts circuit but also the necessary infrastructure and operations control center to ensure robust network operation. However, by failing to extend the GCCIA-owned backbone through the UAE all the way to Oman, and relying on a UAE-owned grid for power transfers, the GCC effectively created a weak link that could impede future attempts to use the grid commercially.
Since its completion, the GCC interconnector has been an unqualified success in terms of its original mandate to improve energy reliability. In 2015 alone, the system was used 185 times to provide emergency cross-border power supplies to overcome temporary production and transmission problems in individual GCCIA member countries. Trading within the GCCIA surpassed 1.3 million megawatt hours (MWh) in 2016. The availability of the network also allowed members to reduce their spinning reserves and to reduce installed capacity requirements, with significant economic benefits. The GCCIA estimates that in 2016 actual capital and fuel savings for the GCC countries totaled $400 million. By 2020, the capital outlays are expected to be $3 billion lower than they would have been without the regional ties.
However, the GCCIA's management quickly understood that there was scope for further commercial value beyond the original mandate to provide emergency backup and, in 2006, received a mandate from its board to work toward the commercial exploitation of the system. In practical terms, this involves the promotion of bilateral trades in power supplies between member states, eventually leading to the creation of a GCC power market. Indeed, the GCCIA's Board now regards Introduction the establishment of a power market as the second phase of its mission and its primary goal. In 2015 the GCC Electricity and Water Ministerial Committee approved plans to waive interconnection fees to encourage GCCIA member states to use the grid for power trade deals.
Moreover, in 2009 the GCCIA completed the legal framework required to ensure cross-border trade. Two key documents were approved and signed by member states: the Power Exchange and Trading Agreement (PETA) and Interconnection Transmission Code (ITC) that regulate the commercial relationship between seller, off-takers and the transmission service operators (TSOs), as well as the GCCIA.
In 2016, GCCIA bilateral power trading exceeded 1.3 million MWh (value of $161 million) through the involvement of five of the six GCC member states, ultimately establishing over 15 contracts. By mid-2016, the GCCIA reported a number of one-off bilateral deals, including a 400 megawatt (MW) (interview 2017) between the Saudi Electricity Company (SEC) and the Abu Dhabi Water and Electricity Company (ADWEC).
In addition to the variation of load curves and differences in the cost of generation, fundamental changes in the region's energy mix are potentially major drivers of increased power trading. These include a growing deficit of local gas supplies, the introduction of nuclear power and the fast growth of renewable energy. Natural gas has been the cornerstone of the region's energy mix since the 1970s. Except for Saudi Arabia, the region has used indigenously-produced natural gas for most of its domestic power generation and water desalination. But domestic natural gas is increasingly in deficit: The UAE, Bahrain and Kuwait have been forced to start importing liquefied natural gas (LNG) for power generation, while Oman is struggling to produce enough gas. Only Qatar has abundant supplies of natural gas. So long as states such as the UAE, Bahrain and Kuwait continue to buy LNG at international market prices, there will be an incentive to look for cheaper alternatives, potentially within the region.
The construction of four nuclear power reactors in the UAE, with 5.6 gigawatts (GW) due on-stream in 2018, will provide a quarter of the UAE's anticipated electricity demand by 2020 (World Nuclear 2017). Nuclear power would provide base-load electricity for the entire system in most other countries, but the UAE's dependence on combined cycle gas-fired power plants for its water supplies to a large extent negates the base-load premise of nuclear power. The Emirates Nuclear Electricity Corporation might find itself, in effect, having to export its base-load at times of low seasonal demand. An additional driver for cross-border trade in electricity will come from the growth of renewable energy, notably solar photovoltaics (PV), whose intermittency will produce peaks and troughs in supply that can be more easily managed through cross-border flows.
Water desalination remains a critical element of the regional power equation, given the dependency of most GCC states on gas-and oil-fired plants for water desalination. GCC states have been slow to take up the opportunities offered by reverse osmosis technology which, while requiring energy, is not directly linked to gas-fired turbines. In 2015, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's Saline Water Conversion Corporation announced plans for a new unit named Jeddah 4 that will have a desalination capacity of 400,000 cubic meters per day and will incorporate reverse osmosis technology. The UAE and Saudi Arabia are pursuing solar desalination; Saudi Arabia will build the world's first commercial solar desalination plant in Al-Khafji.
Power generation capacity in the GCC as a whole currently totals 148 GW. The region will need to add as much as 76.8 GW over the next five years, at a cost of $50 billion (Ventures Onsite for Middle East Electricity 2016). Increased energy trade would be a way to optimize investments at a time when decreasing oil prices are placing national budgets under stress.
Despite a small number of bilateral commercial power sales agreements, a fully-fledged power market remains little more than an aspiration. Obstacles include political concerns about excessive dependence on neighboring countries for a strategic resource, differences in national energy policies, price distortions caused by subsidies, differences in the structure of national power systems, the low number of market participants, the emergence of a new class of players, and regulators with different priorities.
Furthermore, as this study will show, there is a fundamental mismatch between potential buyers and sellers that goes beyond the issue of price. While consumers are by their nature anxious to buy, producers appear to lack the urgency required to adjust their governance structure around the GCC grid in order to establish a market.
When and if the development of a fully-fledged power market in the GCC happens, it will inevitably be driven by key decision-makers across each of the six GCC member states, either acting individually or as a group. The analysis in this paper suggests that these decision-makers, while broadly supportive, have some way to go before they fully endorse the creation of a fully functioning power pool. An interim solution based on a series of bilateral trading relationships is much more likely. This paper focuses on the political feasibility of allowing electricity transactions across borders in the GCC region. Stakeholders views on the issue of developing a GCC-wide electricity market informs expectations of what can realistically be agreed. This analysis applies a modeling framework developed at KAPSARC to assess collective decision-making processes (CDMPs), known as the KAPSARC Toolkit for Behavioral Analysis (KTAB). For a more detailed description of KTAB, CDMPs, and the specific model utilized in this paper, please refer to Efird (2015a and 2015b) .
The KAPSARC Toolkit for Behavioral Analysis (KTAB) K TAB is a platform that enables the modeling and analysis of CDMPs. CDMPs are different to other decision-making processes in that:
They involve more than one actor (individuals, institutions, or identifiable groups or 'blocs').
A single decision is arrived at as a result of coordinated interaction between a finite set of actors.
The form of this interaction is different to large group decision-making processes, such as the market-based derivation of a price, for example, which is the result of the uncoordinated actions of countless individuals.
This paper presents an analysis of plausible outcomes for the CDMPs that decision-makers and stakeholders in each of the GCC states are currently engaged in, regarding the potential to trade power over the GCC Interconnection Grid. It uses a specific instantiation of a model in KTAB, based on the Spatial Model of Politics (SMP), one of the most prominent and best established CDMP models. SMP analyzes collective choice or actions of societal actors with various preferences, behavior assumptions and information under pre-defined institutional rules. The theory assumes an individual has well-defined preferences over a given set of alternatives, and will choose an alternative based on no other alternative in the set being more preferred by the individual; that is, the social actor will choose a 'best' alternative. The SMP model examines the possibility that individual preferences are directly aggregated into a collective preference relation, which is then maximized to yield a set of best alternatives, where 'best' is the most preferred with respect to the collective preference relation (AustenSmith and Banks 1998). While this paper uses one model for its simulations, KTAB is a toolkit that enables an almost limitless implementation of variant models, based on different assumptions as to how various CDMPs work. Any of the assumptions in this paper can be changed, and new models built in the KTAB framework. This paper focuses on the logic of the analysis and presents a description of the results. It does not provide a detailed technical description of the underlying model and its calculations. The following two KAPSARC papers provide more details of the underlying model:
"An Introduction to the KAPSARC Toolkit for Behavioral Analysis (KTAB) Using OneDimensional Spatial Models" (Wise, Lester and Efird 2015a) . "Multidimensional Bargaining using KTAB" (Wise, Lester and Efird 2015b) .
Both papers are available from KAPSARC's website, specifically the KTAB portal, as is the program's source code and documentation. Please visit http://ktab.kapsarc.org for all related papers and http://kapsarc.github.io/KTAB/ for the latest version of the software. The analysis in this paper utilized KTAB version 1.0.
By separating the technical detail from this applied discussion in this way, the hope is to make the discussion more accessible for what is a relatively new field to most readers.
Approach and assumptions
When analyzing CDMPs, one way to show the preferences of, and differences of opinion between the various actors is to represent them graphically, using a technique referred to as spatial preferences. In this approach, the distances between points on a line that captures possible advocacy reflect the spatial component (Wise, Lester and Efird 2015b; Efird, Lester and Wise 2016) . This approach forms the basis for a model implemented in KTAB: the SMP. This paper applies the SMP to the question of the political feasibility of trading electricity over the GCC interconnection. Other work describes the SMP approach exemplified in KTAB in detail (Efird et al. 2016) . For this study, the essential aspects of the SMP are that a set of actors is defined with differing positions on issues, the influence they can exert on each issue, and the salience (or concern) they have for each issue. Position, influence and salience are all captured numerically on a scale of 0 to 100 during semistructured interviews with subject matter experts. It is the combination of influence and salience that gives a particular actor his, her or their ultimate power in making the particular outcome for an issue more or less likely. Appendix 1 provides further details on the KTAB SMP. There is no such thing as a 'rule of thumb' regarding how the simulation unfolds. Sometimes actors will move only incrementally as the turns progress; sometimes they may make much larger moves in the simulation. Appendix 2 provides a brief, nontechnical, description of the logic behind the simulation. This paper focuses on the high-level outcomes calculated by the KTAB simulation and explains the numeric calculations that result in the most interesting shifts in actor positions.
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Defining the question
This KTAB study addresses the following question: What is the level of support for, and opposition against, a regional electricity market in the GCC? To analyze this question, the study begins by defining the spectrum of positions, as shown in Figure 2 . The spectrum reflects the range of positions that actors in this simulation might take, capturing the degree of support for, or opposition to, a GCC power pool. The intent at this point is not to evaluate the specifics that might be included in establishing the market, but to assess the political environment and actors' views about whether there is any viable option for power trading.
As Figure 2 indicates, actors that take a position close to 50 are indifferent to the notion of power trading. Actors taking a position of 100, at the far right of the figure, fully support GCC grid connectivity with open electricity trading, and actors at position 0, at the far left of the figure, are extremely opposed to the idea. Positions ranging from 50 to 0 reflect increasing opposition, with an implied willingness to reduce the use of the GCC grid as the value approaches zero. Positions ranging from 50 to 100 reflect increasing support, with an implied willingness to increase use of the GCC grid as the value approaches 100.
The KTAB SMP data inputs
This study sourced data from interviews with 30 experts. The study team traveled to each of the six GCC countries to meet with the experts and interview them about the data required for their respective countries. The data collection was completed in the spring of 2017 but reconfirmed with a subset of experts more recently to account for the dispute with Qatar. The experts were knowledgeable about the stakeholders, or actors, for their particular country. That is, the experts provided input on the actors who had the ability to influence the decision to trade power with their neighbor states, for each country. The data collection phase of the study took place before the recent GCC diplomatic dispute between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain. For this reason, the data may no longer capture the current state of GCC relations on this topic. Nevertheless, the underlying dynamic and trends should still be applicable. 
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As with any KTAB study, this study identifies a comprehensive list of actors, including policymakers and influencers, and has gathered data in semistructured interviews with the aforementioned experts on three specific quantitative attributes for each actor. Specifically, this included the following attributes for each actor:
Position: the location of an actor on the linear spectrum. In other words, what is the actor's advocacy concerning support for, or opposition to, a regional power market?
Influence: the relative degree of political power for each actor. The most powerful actor is assigned a value of 100, and other actors are weighted relative to the most powerful actor.
Salience: the relative priority each actor assigns to the idea of a regional power market compared with other issues over which the actor must exert influence.
The following experts were interviewed:
A consultant in the Ministry of Electricity in Kuwait.
A senior executive at the Kuwait Foundation for the Advancement of Science.
The head of research at an Abu Dhabi-based research center.
A consultant to the Abu Dhabi Water and Electricity Authority.
The managing director at an international energy trade company based in the UAE.
A leading consultant in sustainability based in the UAE.
A senior advisor based in Qatar.
A director at the Abdullah Bin Hamad Al-Attiyah Foundation for Energy and Sustainable Development.
A manager at the Qatar Electricity & Water Company.
A researcher at Nibras Power, based in Qatar.
An advisor to the Qatari energy minister.
A senior executive at the Public Authority for Electricity & Water.
A professor at the Sultan Qaboos University.
An expert on Oman oil.
The Oman Electricity Transmission Company.
A renewable energy consultant based in Oman.
A senior director at the Saudi Ministry of Economy and Planning.
An advisor at the Saudi Ministry of Economy and Planning.
A senior executive at the GCC Interconnection Authority.
A professor at the University of Bahrain.
The study aggregates the data into a single dataset, termed the baseline dataset. Differences of opinion regarding the assignment of values, particularly for key stakeholders, are noted in order to perform a sensitivity analysis. One baseline data set was created for each of the six GCC countries. Given the large quantity of data collected, spanning six countries, all data is in Tables A2-A7, in Appendix 3. The study uses the collective knowledge of the actors from the 30 interview subjects to assign values
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for position, influence and salience. These last two properties were used to calculate exercised power.
These data were then used to simulate the collective decision-making process between and among the actors in this study, for each country separately, and then for all actors simultaneously. That is, the simulation covered how the actors in each country interact with, and influence, each other over time to arrive at an 'outcome' for an issue. This reflects a model-based view of the expected outcome for actors' collective support for -or opposition to -a regional power market.
The KTAB module used in this paper is the SMP. More information about the SMP can be found in Appendix 2 as well as in Efird (2015a, 2015b) .
Simulation Results
A
fter sourcing and handling the data, a KTAB SMP simulation was performed for each of the six countries individually, in addition to a GCC-wide simulation. The results of the simulations show the actors' movements within the CDMP through turns (the model's measure of time). These results enable inferences to be drawn about the political feasibility of a regional electricity grid among the actors modeled. Here, two types of visualizations are included to facilitate the interpretation of the model output. First, bar charts (Figures 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19, 21, 22) show the distribution of the actors' positions and exercised power (the product of influence multiplied by salience) over the position spectrum. The first figure in each pair provides a visualization of turn 0 (reflecting the data collected from the group of experts before any model calculations), and the second figure in each pair provides a visualization of the final turn (depicting the final position of each actor, after KTAB has calculated the CDMP over each turn). Second, line graphs (Figures 5, 8, 11, 14, 17, 20, 23 ) present the changing positions of each stakeholder over all turns. Together these different figures help to tell a story of the evolving views for actors in each country on this question, based on the data collection process and simulation results.
In the bar charts, each actor is represented as a segment of a bar. The location of the bars on the horizontal axis indicates the position they take. For simplicity, when actors take roughly the same position, they are stacked on top of one another and rounded to the nearest interval. The height of the bars represents exercised power, which is calculated by multiplying influence and salience. The overall height of the bar demonstrates the power in support of that position among the collection of actors. Actors are color-coded to reflect groups of similar actors. For example, government members are colored dark green, while an energyconsuming company is orange. The color-coding in the bar chart, according to this schema, is purely to assist the reader in identifying actor groups. The grouping and color-coding do not have any effect on the SMP calculations.
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia is not only the GCC's largest economy but is also home to its largest electricity market, with peak demand in 2015 recorded at 62.26 GW and total capacity at 80.5 GW. Power demand in Saudi Arabia is projected to increase to about 75 GW by 2020 and 120 GW by 2032. Power generation is entirely dependent on fossil fuels: mostly oil in addition to natural gas.
Despite possessing the world's fifth largest natural gas reserves, the country does not export gas as it uses the entire production to meet domestic consumption mainly from two sectors, petrochemicals and electricity generation. The country is planning on doubling its production of natural gas in the coming years, in an initiative toward cleaner energy. Saudi Arabia is planning on producing 3.5 GW of renewables by 2020 and 9.5 GW by 2023, primarily through solar and wind power generation.
Plans to set up grid connections with Egypt and Jordan might provide GCC countries the opportunity to ultimately access European grids. This could allow the GCC countries to trade excess power with European countries during winters and summers. This trade will be mutually advantageous because off-peak demand in the GCC region occurs during the winter, while off-peak demand in Europe occurs during the summer. The abundance of natural resources in Saudi Arabia allows for cheaper inputs into power generation. The Kingdom's vast technical expertise and spare power capacity illustrate its potential to become a major net power exporter through the GCC Interconnection Grid, and a leader of an inter-GCC, as well as an intercontinental, power market.
The results of the KTAB simulation for Saudi Arabia suggest growing political feasibility, meaning that decision-makers in the Kingdom are increasingly open to a fully functioning power market through the GCC grid. The following three visualizations show the results: Figures 3 and 4 depict the model data and final output as bar charts which display the distribution of actors' positions over the spectrum of positions ranging from opposition, neutral, to supportive of GCC electricity trading over a range of 0 to 100, as defined in Figure 2 . Table A2 in Appendix 3 shows the initial expert-based data regarding the position, influence and salience of the actors. Figure 3 visualizes the various actors' initial positions before running the KTAB simulation (i.e., turn 0). These positions are based on the weighted average of expert-generated data, collected in structured interviews, as seen in Table A2 , Appendix 3. Initially, there is a range of views regarding power trading, mostly ranging from a neutral to a positive disposition, except for the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA) adopting a slightly negative position. The positions are distributed through four primary clusters of actors. The two largest clusters are anchored by Royal Court actors at positions 70 and 80; while advisors at the Ministry of Energy, Industry and Mineral Resources (MEIM), and the SEC are among the more powerful actors at position 70. The second cluster also includes the governor of the Electricity and Co-Generation Regulatory Authority (ECRA) at position 80. These actors are quite favorable to the idea of a fully functioning power market through the GCC grid, given the expert input. The other cluster is anchored by the MEIM minister, deputy minister of MEIM for electricity affairs, the Renewable Energy Project Development Office and the Aramco CEO at position 60. These actors are only moderately favorable to the idea of a fully functioning power market through the GCC grid, given the expert input. The third cluster is anchored by the ministers of foreign affairs and finance at position 50, a neutral view.
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Source: KAPSARC analysis.
Source: KAPSARC analysis. 
While the Saudi Arabian simulation ran for 16 turns, as indicated in Figure 4 , the makings of the final consensus between points 60-80 are apparent as early as the fifth turn (shown in Figure 5 ). Four turns later, during the ninth turn, that consensus begins to stabilize between points 65 and 70. There were very minimal changes in position in the remaining seven turns, ultimately reaching a consensus around a position of 70, suggesting a favorable Saudi opinion regarding inter-GCC energy trading. This indicates that power trading over the GCC regional grid is expected to be politically feasible from a Saudi perspective.
ECRA was unwavering near its initial position of about 80 during the entire length of the simulation. With a very high salience score (strong commitment to its position), as well as growing consensus near its position, there is no reason for ECRA to compromise on its position. Table A2 . The remaining turns are the results from the KTAB SMP simulation. In each turn, actors apply political pressure to influence other actors to adjust their positions. At the same time, actors may apply counter pressure that might result in a position that splits the difference and thereby shifts positions from one turn to the next. Actors are balancing their desire to achieve their preferred outcome against building a consensus for an outcome -a position on the spectrum -that is close to their preferred outcome. As such, simulated changes in position capture the give-and-take that happens during a political bargaining process. The vertical axis shows the range of positions from 0 to 100. The horizontal axis shows turns of this simulation. Individual actors are color-coded according to the key on the righthand side of the figure, consistent with the groups of actors listed in Table A2 . This simulation leads to a narrowed range of positions, though there is nothing in the model that requires a consensus to emerge. The "approach and assumptions" section earlier in this paper provides more detail on the intuition of the progression of turns in the SMP simulation.
As While the KTAB simulation result suggests a favorable view within the Saudi Arabian government for electricity trading in the GCC, there has been little progress in the creation of a fully functioning inter-GCC power market. This lack of progress may be attributed to Saudi actors' salience scores, where the average Saudi salience score was only 28. In other words, there is no clear champion for this issue inside the Saudi decision-making apparatus -no one assigns a high priority to the issue of pushing forward regional power trading. While the question of electricity trading is politically feasible, there are too many other issues of higher priority to Saudi decision-makers for meaningful progress to be observed in the real world, particularly given the number of crucial issues that Saudi policymakers in the energy space are now grappling with.
United Arab Emirates
Due to the federal structure of the UAE, its power sector comprises three distinct but interconnected systems: Abu Dhabi, Dubai and the Northern Emirates. In total, the three systems operate 28.63 GW of mainly gas-fired power stations with peak load recorded at around 20 GW in 2015. The fast pace of economic development and population growth means that annual demand growth is expected to rise by 9 percent annually, with plans to double capacity by 2030.
The region's gas deficit poses a major challenge for the UAE. Despite large reserves, most of the UAE's production is associated gas which is not enough to supply growing demand. As gas provides over 90 percent of its electricity generation, both Abu Dhabi and Dubai are already currently importing LNG. However, the UAE is taking steps to reduce its dependency on natural gas and plans to reduce the proportion of gas in the energy mix from 90 percent to 70 percent by 2021. Dubai is leading the way on the renewables front, with 25 percent of the electricity supply expected to come from solar plants by 2030.
Analysis of Support for a GCC Electricity Market
But not all of Dubai's energy plans are clean; the emirate is also planning 4.8 GW of coal-fired plants to offset the intermittency of renewable energy.
Abu Dhabi has set a target for solar generation to provide 7 percent of electricity capacity by 2020. Its solution to natural gas dependency is nuclear energy, with an expected capacity of 5.6 GW by 2020. However, the nuclear industry's ability to provide base load energy is constrained by Abu Dhabi's continued dependency on combined cycle gas-fired plants to produce desalinated water for the emirate. Exporting power, therefore, becomes an attractive proposition.
Given this background, the KTAB simulation results among the UAE actors for trading power through the GCC grid suggest a politically favorable environment. The data collected consider the establishment of a GCC-wide power market among a variety of actors in the UAE. Figures 6 and 7 are constructed in the same way as Figures 3 and 4 . Table A3 shows the actors' initial expert-based position, influence and salience. Figure 6 shows the input data for turn 0 for the UAE. The simulation ends at turn 17, as shown in Figure 7 . However, a rough consensus was achieved earlier by turn 8, with only small shifts in position taking place in later turns. The largest number of actors, with the greatest collective exercised power, end the simulation at a position of 70. The minister of energy and the deputy minister of energy in the UAE (the green bars at a position of 90) and the ADWEC advisor (the light orange bar at a position of 80) are the strongest advocates for regional trading and remain so throughout the simulation. Thus, there is moderately strong support for trading electricity over the GCC grid, and this result suggests that expanded use of the grid is politically feasible from the UAE perspective. Three actors appeared to be the drivers for building consensus around moderately strong support (position 70): the two Royal Court actors and the national security advisor. After a few turns, actors less supportive of trading over the GCC grid appear to understand aligning with the 'winning coalition' (the two Royal Court actors and the national security advisor) is in their interests. Thus, Figure 8 suggests that the political will in support of trading electricity over the GCC grid is growing over time among UAE actors.
Qatar
Endowed with plentiful natural gas resources and surplus electricity generating capacity, Qatar is a potential exporter of power. The power sector is partially unbundled with a single buyer, Qatar Water and Electricity Corporation, known as Kahramaa, and a dominant producer, Qatar Electricity and Water Company (QEWC), which owns or has equity stakes in all the country's power plants, including several independent power producers (IPPs).
Qatar's current power generating capacity stands at 8.6 GW and demand in 2015 peaked at a record 6.7 GW. The country has plans to increase solar energy capacity to 1.8 GW by 2020, and 10 GW by 2030. In October 2016, Qatar Petroleum (QP) signed a new long-term sale and purchase agreement with Dolphin Energy for gas exports to the UAE via a pipeline owned by Dolphin Energy. After the UAE (along with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain) severed diplomatic ties with Qatar in June 2017, the Dolphin agreement appears to have continued without interruption. There has been no indication of any plan to shut the gas flow to the UAE and Oman, due to the continuing energy demand from both countries. Furthermore, Qatari participation in the GCCIA has not changed. They remain engaged on a practical level with the physical interconnection.
Selling gas by wire could be an attractive option if the spark spread warranted it. QP is the sole arbiter of gas allocations in Qatar. If QP were to supply incremental gas for power exports, it would demand a higher price. However, with the UAE and Kuwait already using gas bought as LNG on the international market, Qatar should be able to achieve an attractive price for its gas sold as power to neighboring countries. Beyond QP and QEWC, many of Qatar's key decision-makers would be involved in the decision to export power since Qatar would effectively be exporting its sole natural resource.
Turning to the KTAB analysis, there is initially a range of views in Qatar regarding the creation of a GCC-wide electricity market, as shown in Figure 9 . Table A4 
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As shown in Figure 10 , a rough consensus emerges in support of a moderately positive view on trading by turn 12. QEWC remains more supportive than most actors at position 80 throughout the simulation. QP becomes more supportive, shifting to position 70, over the course of the simulation. No actors appear to take a neutral or negative view of trading over the GCC grid by turn 12, suggesting that greater utilization of the grid is politically feasible from a Qatari perspective. Figure 11 is constructed in the same way as Figure 5 . As Figure 11 shows, the attempt to find a common position regarding the GCC electricity market appears to continue for around eight turns in the simulation, though a rough consensus is mostly achieved before the simulation terminates. This supports the conclusion drawn from the prior figures that there is growing consensus in support of developing an inter-GCC power market. It is important to note that the data on Qatari actors' political will to trade electricity over the GCC grid with the other GCC countries were based on interviews conducted before Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain severed diplomatic relations with Qatar. However, as described later in the paper, these data probably still capture the long-term view of these actors.
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Kuwait operates a traditional centralized power model: The Ministry of Electricity and Water (MEW) has near-total control of the nation's power generation and distribution. However, the government is now mulling plans to partially privatize and unbundle the sector. Generating capacity stood at 18.3 GW at the end of 2015, with peak demand reaching 12.81 GW. Several new projects, totaling 6.13 MW, mean that the country's total generating capacity will rise to 21.69 GW. With demand anticipated to increase to between 22.5 GW and 25.4 GW by 2020, total capacity is ultimately projected to increase to 25 GW by 2020. Even though more than half of Kuwait's existing plants can burn either fuel oil or gas, most of them continue to depend on fuel. All the new plants planned by MEW are mainly gas, with solar and wind units expected to produce 15 percent of Kuwaiti generation by 2030.
As new gas-fired power plants come on stream, the flexibility and scheduling of Kuwait's LNG imports will be critical. Power exports, including seasonal power swaps to other GCC countries, could become an attractive option, paving the way for improved gas contract terms as well as providing an additional source of revenue. In 2015 Kuwait agreed to a power swap with Bahrain under which it made available 100 MWh during a period of peak summer demand. The power swap gave Bahrain security of supply, while Kuwait was able to sell excess power during the commissioning phase.
However, Kuwait's political system creates uncertainty. Unlike other GCC states, Kuwait has an active and vocal parliament that is empowered to analyze and discuss a wide range of issues, especially energy. Any systematic attempt to export power could come under scrutiny and could potentially be blocked.
The results of the KTAB simulation for Kuwait yielded a moderately positive result, implying that decision-makers in Kuwait are likely to be open to a fully functioning power market through the GCC grid. Table A5 details the actors' data. Initially, most Kuwaiti actors range from a slightly negative, to neutral, to a generally positive position ( Figure  12 ). In the initial set of positions shown in Figure  12 , Kuwaiti actors are in one of four clusters. The cluster with the highest aggregate exercised power takes a neutral view at position 50, anchored by the National Control Center, the National Assembly (Kuwaiti parliament), the speaker, and businessinterested members of the National Assembly. Only two actors held a slightly unfavorable view at position 40; the stronger of the two is the Chamber of Commerce/merchant class, and the other is the relevant committee in the National Assembly.
The Kuwaiti simulation ran for 13 turns, as shown in Figure 13 . However, a strong consensus develops around position 60 by the seventh turn, with only minor changes in positions for the remaining six turns until the end of the simulation, as shown in the line graph ( Figure 14) . As with Figures 8 and 11 , Figure 14 is constructed in the same way as Figure 5 . The two actors with a slightly unfavorable view (position 40)
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remain negative for the first four to five turns of the simulation, before shifting to a favorable view at point 70, finally settling with the majority position of 60.
The Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research (KISR), the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation, and the minister for electricity and water remain outliers until the end of the simulation. They appear to view the issue more favorably than the remainder of actors for the duration of the simulation, perhaps because of their high exercised power. By maintaining a more positive position than other actors, KISR played a key role in consolidating the support of more actors at position 60.
By the end of the simulation, position 60 is the most supported position, a marginally positive view of expanding electricity trade over the GCC grid. This is not a large shift from turn 0. The emir and the Royal Court favored position 60, and half of the Kuwaiti actors occupied positions between 50 and 60. Despite a powerful cluster of actors at the neutral position of 50, the cluster of actors anchored by the emir was the more powerful of the two, with an average exercised power of 33.5 compared to 26. This lead the neutral actors to join the more powerful, and more positive, group of actors. From this, Kuwaiti decision-makers seem open to the idea of an inter-GCC power market, though not strongly in favor of it. Despite their more cautious view of the GCC grid, Kuwaiti actors, on average, regard this issue as more important than other GCC member states, with a relatively high average salience score of 55.
Source: KAPSARC analysis. Source: KAPSARC analysis. 
Oman
For the last decade, Oman's power sector has been operating in textbook fashion. The industry became fully unbundled following a restructuring between 2004 and 2006. This included the Ministry of Electricity ceding authority to the Public Authority for Electricity and Water (PAEW), the creation of an independent regulator, the appointment of a single buyer, the establishment of transmission and distribution companies, in addition to multiple independent power generating companies. With a 2015 peak demand of 6.1 GW, and a total generating capacity of 7.8 GW, mainly gas-fired, Oman is facing the challenge of growing demand at a time when the sultanate's domestic supplies are constrained. Oman's Ministry of Oil and Gas has stated that future gas supplies are limited. Aside from a recently announced 1 GW PV project in Duqm, no renewable energy projects are planned for the near future.
It is estimated that Oman's energy demand will grow by 8 percent per year. To meet this anticipated growth in demand, it has planned 4.8 GW of new capacity. Starting in 2018-19, the Oman Power and Water Procurement Company (OPWP) aims to trial a power spot market, with the aim of full implementation in 2021-22.
Oman was the last country to join the GCCIA, in December 2014, and is now connected to the GCCIA grid via the UAE grid. The complex structure of the Omani power sector and the focus by the regulator on securing a well-functioning domestic system could potentially hinder cross-border trade. Political tensions between Oman and the UAE could be a further complicating factor. The following three visualizations show the KTAB simulation results for Oman. Figure 15 (based on expert-based data shown in Table A6 ) and Figure 16 display the final distribution of actors' positions. Figure  17 is the line graph of all turns in the simulation.
At first, there is a range of views among Omani stakeholders, ranging from 50 to 80, regarding trading power over the GCC Interconnection Grid. Nevertheless, every actor takes either a neutral or a positive view of the issue. Actors' positions can be grouped into three large clusters, in terms of exercised power. The largest cluster is led by the sultan at position 70 (who is also the prime minister, or PM), along with other actors such as the PAEW, the Supreme Council for Planning, Petroleum Development Oman (PDO) and Oman Gas. The second cluster includes the OPWP, the minister of oil and gas (MOOG), the minister of finance (MOF), and Oman Electricity Transmission Company (OETC) at position 80. The third cluster includes the deputy prime minister, Authority for Electricity Regulation, IPPs and other energy companies at position 60. Finally, another smaller cluster consists of internal intelligence and the minister of defense at position 50.
The simulation of Omani actors ran for a shorter number of turns compared to the other GCC member states. Figure 16 presents the final results. A consensus emerges around turns 7 and 8 that slightly favors trading power through the GCC grid (position 60). The position of the PM-anchored group of actors turns out to be the winning position, with all but two actors aligning behind this position by the end of the simulation. The two outliers include internal intelligence and the MOF undersecretary. Internal intelligence, with the highest exercised power among all Omani actors (57), remains in its neutral position throughout the simulation. Source: KAPSARC analysis.
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Figure 17 shows more turn-by-turn detail of actors' changing positions, constructed in the same way as Figure 5 . The MOF undersecretary moved from 80 to 70 after turn 1 and kept that position until the end of the simulation. The strongest supporters of electricity trading, the MOOG and MOF undersecretaries, settled on a less favorable position between turns 1 and 2. The final actor to join the winning coalition is OPWP, moving down after the sixth turn from a more supportive position of 70. OPWP has a high exercised power of 42, which made it more resistant to pressure from other actors. Thus, by the end of the simulation, Omani actors' collective view on the issue of trading is slightly favorable. Expanded use of the GCC grid appears politically feasible from an Omani perspective, but without a strong support base.
Bahrain
The Electricity and Water Authority (EWA) is responsible for generation, transmission and distribution of electricity in Bahrain. The country is planning to shift to a single-buyer model and has privatized the Al-Hidd, Al-Ezzel and Aldur power plants.
Bahrain has about 0.1 billion barrels of proven reserves of crude oil and 92 billion cubic meters of natural gas reserves. The country has nearly 4 GW of installed generating capacity. Natural gas is considered the primary fuel source for electricity generation. Electricity demand in the country is growing rapidly, fueled by population growth and expansion of the industrial sector. Peak demand growth for electricity in Bahrain reached 8.1 percent in 2014 and was recorded at 3.5 percent in 2015. Peak demand was recorded at around 3.1 GW in 2015. The state's Electricity and Water Authority (EWA) is predicting consumption will continue to increase by an annual average of up to 6.4 percent until 2020, when required capacity is expected to reach close to 5.5 GW. To meet these needs, Bahrain is investing in several new power projects and has set a target for renewable sources to meet 5 percent of electricity generation by 2025 and 10 percent by 2035.
The results of the KTAB simulation for Bahrain yielded a strong consensus among actors in Bahrain, implying that decision-makers in Bahrain are likely to be supportive of a fully functioning power market through the GCC grid. Table A7 shows expert-based data.
Initially, all Bahraini actors are either neutral or in favor of regional power trading (Figure 18 It appears from these results that not only is expanded use of the GCC grid politically feasible from the Bahraini perspective but the issue of trading is of higher importance to Bahrain than most other GCC member states. As Bahrain is the least energy independent country in the GCC, this is not a surprising result. Source: KAPSARC analysis. T he GCC states agreed to establish the GCC Interconnection Grid over a decade ago, with the aim of increasing energy security in the region. The grid continues to be used mainly for emergencies, even though the economic and financial benefits from commercializing national power production across national borders using the grid were quickly identified. However, in recent years there have been some bilateral sales and purchase agreements. If, as suggested by the KTAB analysis, most countries harbor a favorable view toward power trading, the question remains as to why has power trading not happened?
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KTAB is a unique tool that can help answer this key question. This study ran KTAB simulations for each of the GCC member states individually and for the region as a whole. The results of the simulations indicate that all of the GCC countries are growing in their support of regional power trading, but political inertia has stymied the system's ability to achieve its full economic potential. The current diplomatic dispute with Qatar might disrupt this trend in the Conclusion short-term as the authors expect to witness more bilateral trading; perhaps a subset of the six states could initiate a sub-market to trade power among themselves. If the issue with Qatar is resolved, the long-term trend looks more positive, as reflected in this analysis.
Observed progress to expand utilization of the GCC grid is slow, as described in the earlier sections of this paper. Figure 21 provides a perspective on why this might be the case. This radar chart shows the average salience for actors in each country toward this issue (i.e., the importance assigned to the expanded use of the GCC grid by each country). As the figure shows, Kuwaiti actors assign the highest priority to the GCC grid, yet are the least supportive of expanding the use of the grid (Figure 13) . The strongest advocates, in terms of position, in Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar, do not assign high priority to the expanded use of the GCC grid. Thus, while electricity trading may be politically feasible, it is not a political priority. The GCC countries are facing many challenges, including energy price reform, structural economic reform, the transformation to renewable energy, the implications of the Paris Agreement for long-term economic growth, among a host of other issues. The economies of scale and economic benefit of regional power trading are unlikely to be achieved without assigning a credible policy advocate within each country to ensure progress. Otherwise, it seems likely the other issues outlined above will continue to take precedence and supplant the focus that could be applied to this issue.
The observed lack of progress is attributable to the lack of urgency within the GCC's most influential countries, as measured by low salience levels. Simply put, there is no real drive by any of the main actors to put in place a power trading system, despite the willingness of the GCCIA to provide the logistical backbone required. Part of this lack of policy priority may be due to the perception among GCC countries that they already enjoy a high degree of energy security. As Table 2 shows, the most influential GCC countries also happen to be the region's most energy secure (according to the World Energy Council's Energy Trilemma Index Tool). Saudi Arabia, the most influential GCC member state according to expert data, has the second highest energy security in the GCC (39th worldwide). The other two influential GCC countries, the UAE and Qatar, are both ranked very highly in terms of energy security, which explains the low average salience scores displayed by these countries' actors.
The remainder of the GCC member states are in the opposite situation: their relatively low energy security rankings correspond with higher average saliences when compared with the more energy secure countries. Kuwait, Oman and Bahrain all have relatively high salience values. While Kuwait enjoys more energy security than Oman and Bahrain, its higher salience is most likely due to its usual role as the GCC proponent for unity. Unfortunately for Kuwait, Oman and Bahrain, they are far less influential than the remaining member states. Thus, despite general approval, there is insufficient political drive to generate the momentum required to create a fully-fledged inter-GCC power market. 
Conclusion
Moreover, the issue in focus is not establishing the grid but rather utilizing it for commercial transactions. The question of trading is not currently at the top of any stakeholders' agendas (nor even near the top), especially following the Qatar trade embargo. The more obstacles or arguments that dampen enthusiasm for GCC power trade, the higher the bar for sufficient political will to get started. Additionally, even if implementing this system makes sense economically (and is technically feasible), stakeholders do not perceive the financial gain to be high enough to motivate action, as reflected in the KTAB data and simulation results.
In short, there appears no pressing economic or technical reason that would bring this issue to the top of the principal stakeholders' agendas. This is likely to remain the case as long as local power companies have as their primary mandate the delivery of secure and stable supplies of electrical power to domestic customers, rather than a wider commercial function to also provide profits for their shareholders. In the meantime, an increase in bilateral trading can be expected in response to purely technical requirements, namely the need to secure power supplies during times of peak summer demand. However, as individual GCC nations embark on unbundling and liberalizing their power markets, the emergence of new players focused on the creation of value for their shareholders could increase the priority assigned to regional power trading. This process could be supported by the establishment of more active regulatory bodies who would play a necessary role in establishing the ground rules for increased power trade. When GCC power companies are free to trade without governmental constraint and decide to explore new economic opportunities afforded by the GCC grid, they are unlikely to face any major barriers to the creation of a fully-fledged power market in the GCC in terms of political feasibility.
Conclusion T
he Spatial Model of Politics (SMP) is one of the most widely applied and accepted models of collective decision-making processes (CDMPs), both technically and informally (Bueno de Mesquita 1997; Abdollahian et al. 2006; Jesse 2011; Efird, Lester and Wise 2016) . Even outside the field of political science, everyday language is imbued with the implicit assumptions of this model. Political parties may be described as right or left wing. Less spatially explicit, there is also a tendency to imply a linear spectrum when describing individuals -or groups, such as political parties -as conservative or liberal, aggressive or passive. Commentators and analysts will often try to uncover the positions held by politicians or other highly placed officials.
For more information on the SMP see the two technical papers cited earlier: Efird (2015a, 2015b) . A brief description of the logic of the SMP follows here.
The SMP uses the following terms:
The set of actors
This comprises all the actors, or stakeholders, that contribute to the resolution of the CDMP in some way. They can be individuals or aggregates of individuals. Aggregates can be formal, such as a corporation, or informal, such as loose affiliations based on interests. The latter could include young men sharing a love of fast cars, for example. The constraint is that it must be possible to reasonably assume that each actor is a unitary entity, speaking with a single voice.
The following framework can be used to understand the range of viable outcomes rather than to narrow them down to a single 'most likely' or expected outcome.
A spectrum of positions
This is a way of mapping out the range of responses and positions actors could give/take to a given question in the form of a linear continuum of possible positions. The extreme ends of the spectrum are associated with extreme positions. In response to the question of private participation, one end could be 'extremely limited private sector participation,' the other 'a policy environment that is open and conducive to private participation.' These extremes are then labeled as 0 and 100, converting a qualitative spectrum into a numeric one where each position is given its own score.
The spectrum is a scale where distance measures the change in consequences for the actors: the gap between positions corresponds to the difference in the outcome. An implicit assumption is that all actors roughly agree on the order of potential costs implied by the spectrum. The potential political difficulty of moving from position 25 to position 50 would be of roughly the same magnitude as that involved in moving from 50 to 75. In other words, the spectrum requires reasonable calibration.
The set of positions
With identified actors and a defined spectrum of positions, the position (i.e., the advocacy) of each actor can then be mapped to the spectrum with a number between 0 and 100.
Measures of influence
Not all actors are equally powerful. Influence measures how easily the actor can shape the outcome of the CDMP, if fully motivated. It does not describe how likely the actor's preferred position is to win, nor is it a measure of the actor's motivation to win. It is the actor's clout, or political power, as applied to the question, assuming that each actor will bring its full resources to winning the negotiation and taking account of all its formal and informal powers.
Influence scores are relative: an influence score of 60 means that an actor is twice as influential as one with a score of 30. Influence scores are also additive: two actors in coalition, each with influence Appendix 1. The Spatial Model of Politics Table A1 . Definition of salience scores.
Source: KAPSARC analysis. 30, could block an actor with influence 60. The combination of relativity and additivity can make influence the most cumbersome score to collect. Each actor's score needs to be calibrated against that of all the other actors.
Again, influence is scored against a range of 0 to 100. Strictly speaking, if an actor is assigned an influence score of 0, then it would have no power and would not be counted as an actor.
Measures of salience
Regardless of an actor's position and level of influence, different actors will have different levels of interest in the question. Salience quantifies how much an actor cares about the issue in general. How motivated are actors to exert influence to produce their preferred outcome, if and when the issue arises? One way to answer this question is based on the observation that each actor has a portfolio of issues to which it devotes its attention. Salience identifies the importance of the specific issue in that portfolio, recognizing that people have an implicit budget constraint on exerting their influence across their whole portfolio.
The salience scores are defined in Table A1 and range from 0 to 100.
The salience score is not the amount of time that an actor will devote to the negotiations but rather its willingness to use whatever influence it has to convince others of the merits of its preferred position. The salience score does not represent an actor's influence, merely its motivation when the issue arises.
Once again, salience scores are relative among actors. As with influence, a salience score of 0 would indicate that the actor does not care about the issue and that it should not be counted as an actor.
The calculation of exercised power
This is a derived value, calculated in the model. As previously stated, influence is an indication of the actor's political clout on the particular issue, if fully motivated, while salience indicates how much the actor cares about the issue. Exercised power is the product of these two values and reveals the amount of power the actor will bring to bear on the issue being modeled.
Score Definition
0
The stakeholder is not an actor.
-10
Barely cares -the actor hardly cares and may not be aware of the issue.
-20
Minor issue -the issue is minor, but the actor is aware of it.
-40
One of many -the issue is one of many issues for this actor.
40
Actively monitoring -the actor actively pays attention to progress on the issue.
-60
Cares but not a priority -the issue is something the actor cares about but competes with many other agenda items.
-70
Important but not critical -this is an important issue for the actor, but one of several important issues and not a critical issue.
-90
One of the top issues -the issue is the most important for this actor but there are still a limited number of other issues that need attention.
-100
Top priority -the issue is that actor's absolute top priority.
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